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ABSTRACT Evolution has endowed animals with outstanding adaptive behaviours which are grounded
in the organization of their sensorimotor system. This paper uses inspiration from these principles of
organization in the design of an artificial agent for autonomous driving. After distilling the relevant
principles from biology, their functional role in the implementation of an artificial system are explained.
The resulting Agent, developed in an EU H2020 Research and Innovation Action, is used to concretely
demonstrate the emergence of adaptive behaviour with a significant level of autonomy. Guidelines to adapt
the same principled organization of the sensorimotor system to other agents for driving are also obtained.
The demonstration of the system abilities is given with example scenarios and open access simulation tools.
Prospective developments concerning learning via mental imagery are finally discussed.
INDEX TERMS Adaptive Behaviour, Affordance Competition Hypothesis, Autonomous Driving, Explain-
able Artificial Intelligence.
I. INTRODUCTION
T
HIS paper presents the architecture of an Agent for
autonomous driving that was developed in an EU Hori-
zon 2020 Research and Innovation Action (Grant 731593,
Dreams4Cars). The organization of the Agent sensory-motor
system was conceived with a twofold goal, both inspired
by biological principles: a) to support learning in a “wake-
sleep/dream” scheme, and b) to produce adaptive behaviours
– in the ethological sense – when in use for vehicle operation
(i.e., at the “wake” state) [1].
This paper focuses on the latter aspect, illustrating princi-
ples and good practices for designing a sensorimotor system.
The focus includes ideas and expedients that can also be used
with little effort with (most of) the path planning and control
methods currently in use. Throughout, we use Open Access
simulation tools, and prospective longer-term developments
are discussed in the conclusions
Specifically, the paper invokes several biological ideas (see
Section I-B2) which underpin adaptive behaviours in Nature,
including: topographic organization of motor space, robust
action selection and steering of agent behaviour via biasing
of the action selection. Many of these come together in an
overarching scheme – the Affordance Competition Hypothe-
sis [2] – which we use as a guiding framework.
When these principles are used to organize an artificial
system, benefits similar to those seen in animals emerge such
as safe, natural, adaptive and robust behaviours. A number
of other desirable benefits, such as the ability to deal with
a hierarchy of intentions, prioritizing safety vs legality, and
explainable Artificial Intelligence, are also shown. Notwith-
standing this, we do not claim that the Agent presented
here is optimal; rather we emphasise a set of interrelated
principles that can be adopted, together or separately, to
enhance artificial behaviour.
The paper theory is substantiated with several working
examples for unusual situations and/or scenarios with ran-
domness in the environment and in the behaviour of the
other agents. The examples and simulations tools are open
access, as part of the Open Data produced by the Research
and Innovation Action (Dreams4Cars) [3].
A. NOVELTY AND CONTRIBUTION
The novelty and contribution of this paper is a sensorimotor
architecture based on principles that are successful in Nature.
Among these, the topographic organization of encodings in
motor space, behaviours that are emergent from the com-
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petition between affordable actions, robust action selection
(the MSPRT algorithm) and selection biasing as a means
to prioritize behaviours (for safety/legal/comfort etc.). The
paper describes, with examples, both the overall system and
the individual principles to permit a modular adoption of
these ideas.
As far as we are aware, this is the first time that an
engineered system for self-driving cars has been based on
the large scale architecture of the human brain. Thus, we
invoke ideas contained in the affordance competition hypoth-
esis [2] that sensory input, processed by visual and parietal
cortical brain areas, provides action options or affordances
for decision making by sub-cortical structures (the basal
ganglia). The algorithms for decision making are based on
those previously used to model the basal ganglia [4]. As such,
our system brings together elements of sensory, motor and
decision making competencies found in the brain.
B. RELATED WORK
1) Path planning and control
A large number of methods and variants for trajectory plan-
ning and control are known in the literature. Reviews may be
found in [5]–[9]. In addition, machine learning approaches
should also be mentioned, for example, those based on learn-
ing human driving, e.g., [10]–[12].
For the goals of this paper, only the aspects of this work
that are relevant for the efficient organization of the sensori-
motor system are reviewed here.
The first point to note is that almost all trajectory planning
approaches work by first producing a number of candidate
trajectories and then selecting the “best” one. To link with our
biologically inspired agenda, this two stage approach may be
couched in terms of an initial step of action priming (can-
didate trajectories being established) followed by an action
selection (fixing one trajectory for execution). However, as
will be clarified below, the way in which priming-selection is
carried out can make a great difference in the effectiveness of
an agent behaviour.
Concerning trajectory generation (action priming), two
aspects that characterize the production of candidate trajec-
tories are completeness and computational efficiency. Com-
pleteness means that the space of possible trajectories is
entirely spanned, so that a safe trajectory is found if it exists.
Many trajectory generation methods work by sampling either
the physical (configuration) space or the control space. Too
coarse a sampling may miss finding scarce evasive trajecto-
ries in critical situations. On the other hand, computational
efficiency (software and hardware) limits the number of
candidates that can be analysed at every iteration.
Highly dynamic situations (which often happen in critical
conditions) also pose challenges. Ideally the planning update
rate should be high and the planning latency should be low, so
that fresh plans that respond to unpredictable environmental
changes are promptly available, e.g., [13]. However, for
the execution of a given trajectory, only predictive control
schemes are surely compatible with continuous re-planning,
whereas other types of control (e.g., feedback and pursuit
controllers) may not work because new plans may typically
begin at the current vehicle state and thus cancel the instan-
taneous errors that is used in those control schemes.
Dealing with moving obstacles is also challenging: not
only because obstacle trajectories must be predicted but, also,
because they add one dimension (time) to the planning prob-
lem (a simple, but not complete, method that may be used,
e.g., [14], is that paths are first planned without considering
the obstacles and then the longitudinal dynamics is adapted
to the obstacle movements).
Regarding trajectory selection (action selection), the
choice of one trajectory in a pool of trajectories must meet
multiple objectives: safety, compliance with traffic rules,
travel time, comfort, energy efficiency etc. Often these ob-
jectives are combined into an unique cost function. However
objectives may be better organised in a hierarchy of priori-
ties. Thus, safety should have the highest priority, including
priority over traffic rules (for example, a vehicle should be
allowed crossing solid lane markings if that is the only way
to avoid a collision). In many trade-off approaches, however,
safety and compliance with traffic rules are considered at the
same level as “hard” constraints; whereas only the others are
considered separately as soft goals, e.g., [9].
Finally, the choice of the “optimal” manoeuvre is often
carried out according to a “winner takes all” (WTA) method,
i.e., by selecting the manoeuvre that maximizes the weighted
optimally criterion. However this kind of selection may not
be ideal in case of uncertainties and noise, where more robust
action selection algorithms can be deployed to advantage.
2) Adaptive Behaviour
Discovering and selecting effective behaviours is critical
for animal survival. Natural evolution has produced very
efficient and highly effective methods for such adaptive be-
haviour and, by studying them, it may be possible to improve
the robustness and autonomy of robot behaviour too.
One fundamental idea is the notion of an affordance [15],
[16] which makes an intimate link between perception and
action. In affordance theory, perception is not thought of as
simply an elucidation of a set of abstract features describing
the environment. Rather, the job of perception is to identify
ways in which the animal (or agent) may interact with its
environment by pursuing an effective course of action. For
example, in the current context, a free space like a roadside
parking spot (Fig. 4), offers and affordance for the action of
driving into it and may, on occasion, elicit a possibly life
saving behaviour in order to avoid a collision.
Cisek has articulated a neuroscientifically grounded ver-
sion of affordances and actions in his Affordance Com-
petition Hypothesis [2]. A computational neural model of
affordance priming and selection, based on these ideas has
also been developed [17]. In this model, potential actions are
formed, simultaneously and in parallel, in pathways running
from sensory to the motor cortices; anatomically this com-
prises a dorsal processing stream in the brain (dorsal is the
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upper surface in primates). Potential actions are encoded as
patterns of neural activity, with activation strength reflecting
the value, or “salience” of the encoded action. Actions then
compete for taking control of the agent, with their probability
of success determined by these salience values. According to
Cisek, adaptation to dynamically changing conditions occurs
via “the continuous evaluation of alternative activities that
may become available and continuous tradeoffs between
choosing to persist in a given activity and switching to a dif-
ferent one” [18]. Interestingly for us, there are experimental
studies that support the interpretation of driver behaviours in
terms of selection between affordances [19], [20].
The emergence of adaptive behaviours from the priming-
selection arrangement is also discussed in [21], which high-
lights how using a centralized selection mechanism encoding
action salience with a common scale (instead of a distributed
one such as proposed in [22]) realizes a common evaluation
metric that permits seamless extension of motor abilities via
learning of new action priming loops.
Concerning the sub-problem of the action-selection —
which of the many possible actions is gated to the motor
system— there also are several studies and biologically
grounded computational models [23], [24]. Further, these
neural models have been shown to be describable by deci-
sion making algorithms such as the the multiple-hypothesis
sequential probability ratio test (MSPRT) [4]. Under certain
conditions, the MSPRT allows optimal decision making with
noisy and uncertain signals. It should therefore be unsur-
prising that the brain has recruited such algorithms to guide
animal behaviour. The MSPRT is described in more detail in
Section II-D
Finally, action-selection via the competition of immedi-
ately available affordances may be “biased” by higher level
influences, thereby offering the opportunity of steering agent
behaviours towards long-term goals [25], and the exploration
required for action discovery [26].
C. A CHALLENGING SITUATION
We introduce the architecture using examples of desired
system competencies. Fig. 1 shows a motorway situation
harbouring a danger in which objects might fall from the
minivan.
A human driver would have the ability to predict this pos-
sible event, to mentally simulate possible object trajectories
and to anticipate mitigation strategies (e.g., keep increased
distance, prepare evasive actions, comfortably change the
lane).
Let us assume an artificial driver is not yet capable of
this level of prediction. However, we might request that —
if an object actually falls onto the road— the agent has at
least: 1) the ability of evaluating as many escape strategies
as possible. Furthermore, the falling object, depending of
its nature, might have irregular trajectory. So: 2) continuous
quick adaptations of the current manoeuvre may also be nec-
essary. Finally, it may happen that a collision-free trajectory
is not strictly legal; for example if left and right lanes were
busy, it might happen that fitting in the middle between two
lanes could avoid the accident. This means that safety must
have the priority even, to some extent, over legality and that:
3) motor planning must be carried out to satisfy multiple
hierarchical objectives where lower priority objectives can be
given up if necessary.
II. AGENT ARCHITECTURE
A. FUNCTIONAL LOOPS
Fig. 2 shows the biological basis for the architecture of the
Agent, adapted from [2]1. Of course, we don’t aim to model
the brain architecture faithfully as a large scale neuronal
network; rather, we use the the scheme in Fig. 2 to highlight
a series of functionalities and their interrelationships, which
may be modelled at a high level with other technologies (we
use regular computer code with neural network modules).
We now describe this architecture in more detail, starting
with the action priming stream (the solid red arrow) and the
action selection loop (shown in solid green); the remaining
processing streams will be discussed later.
In the human brain the action priming stream occurs in the
dorsal regions of cortex, and comprises a pathway running
form the sensory cortices (a in the figure) to the motor
cortices c. Of course, the human sensorimotor system is more
complex than the simple unidirectional data flow depicted
by the arrow: other pathways are involved, the flow is not
simply unidirectional (as indicated by the dashed red arrow
in Fig. 2), and information is compressed and expanded by
convergence and divergence in the neural pathways [27].
As noted earlier, we conceive of the action priming path-
way as computing the salience values of candidate trajecto-
ries (the salience is obtained via learned perception-action
associations, without evaluating the trajectories as an inter-
mediate step; see Section II-C4).
Turning to action selection, in the human brain there is an
action selection loop, at the heart of which is a sub-cortical
brain system of interconnected nuclei called the basal ganglia
[24]. The basal ganglia are evolutionary old and common
to all vertebrates, reflecting the fundamental nature of the
behavioural problem of action selection faced by all animals.
As noted earlier, time-efficient decision-making equivalent to
the biological solution can be implemented with the MSPRT
algorithm (Section II-D1).
The basal ganglia are also a locus of learning – enabling
the selection of new actions, and re-emphasising the impor-
tance of existing ones [26]. In this way they offer a mecha-
nism for influencing decision making, effectively steering the
agent behaviour for long-term rewards [25] (Section II-E).
B. ORGANIZATION OF THE ACTION SPACE: THE
“MOTOR CORTEX”
The processing streams in the brain described above have
the critical property of dealing with many actions and affor-
dances in parallel. Further, the representations of the relevant
1For clarity, only the processing streams that are active during vehicle
operation (point b, Section I) are shown.
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FIGURE 1: Example dangerous motorway situation. Objects might fall from the minivan. A human driver has the ability to
predict the possible event, mentally simulate possible object trajectories and elaborate mitigation strategies (keep increased
distance while preparing evasive actions). With current technologies an autonomous vehicles will not be able of such cognition
abilities (note it is not only a matter of perception). Hence, as a mitigation strategies, an automated vehicle should be able to
react to a real falling object by quickly elaborating as many viable trajectories as possible (including trajectories not strictly
legal such as squeezing between the lanes) in order to have the largest possible set of choices.
percepts and actions occurs in an ordered way with similar
items, and features therein, being encoded in proximity to
each other in the neural tissue. This notion of topographic or-
ganization is found across several brain structures [28]–[30],
among which are the sensory and motor cortices referred
to in Fig. 2, a and c, respectively. The use of topographic
organisation has also found its way into abstract neural
networks where, for example, the topographic organization
of the visual cortex had been one inspiring idea of modern
convolutional networks.
We adopt the notion of topographic organization of the
motor cortex to the current context of driving, in the scheme
given in Fig. 3 (bottom). Here, the salience of primed actions
are arranged in a two-dimensional space corresponding to the
instantaneous lateral and longitudinal control.
This arrangement carries a number of benefits that are not
easily obtained when the pool of actions is not arranged in
this way. To our knowledge, the first time topographic organi-
zation had been used for artificial “codrivers” was in the FP7
InteractIVe project ([31], Figure 7). The same organization
has been used in FP7 AdaptIVe and improved in H2020
Dreams4Cars. We may, however, find a prelude of this idea
in the organization of ALVINN [32] where an array of output
neurons is used to topographically encode the steering angle
control of an autonomous land vehicle. ALVINN is, also,
relevant as an example of neuralised sensorimotor system
different form those of Section I-B1 and more conceptually
similar to this paper. Topographic organization and related
action encoding has, also, relation to dynamical systems
theory of behaviours [33], in particular for what concerns
neural field dynamics and behaviour representation.
The notion of topographic organization is better clarified
by means of the example in Fig. 3, which presents a situation
with three legal-lane distinct affordances: a, remaining in
the current lane, b, turning right and c, changing lane to the
left. For each of these legal-level intentions, the agent could
elaborate an infinite number of trajectories, as exemplified
with the bi for the right turn case (of course equally numerous
trajectories also exist for lanes a and c, but they are simply not
shown). There may also be non-legal, but physically feasible,
intentions that basically correspond to using the entire road
surface, e.g., entering the right road in the opposite lane.
The control space of a vehicle has two dimensions, cor-
responding to lateral and longitudinal control. So, in order
to produce one trajectory, the agent must elaborate two
functions of time: the longitudinal control j(t) and the lateral
control r(t). For a given intention, not all trajectories have
the same cost though. Some – namely the smoothest ones
– are easier to produce and less prone to the risk of loss
of control and out of lane/road deviations. One could, for
example still take the right turn by abruptly steering to the
opposite direction for a while and then recovering with a
carefully controlled steering action to the right, for example
implementing b’. However, this would be very difficult to
execute (some could even be physically unfeasible).
For every trajectory γ, generated by a single choice
{j(t), r(t)}, a scalar functional V (γ) can be defined to
represent the “value” of that particular trajectory (see also
Section II-C).
To model different intentions, restrictions on the admis-
sible trajectories γ can be set. For example, the trajectory
for lane change intention must stay inside the current and
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FIGURE 2: The Agent architecture is adapted from [2]. It is
made of a primary sensorimotor pathway that primes many
candidate actions in parallel (red arrow). These potential
actions are encoded, with their salience, topographically ar-
ranged in the motor space (“motor cortex”). The selection
among the possible actions is carried out by means of a
particular competition process that is robust against sensory
and motor noise (green loop). An “action biasing” loop
can steer action selection to implement hard constraints like
traffic rules, as well as long-term action sequences. Once an
action is selected, inverse models of the body dynamics are
used to resolve the action into the low-level motor commands
(blue arrow).
destination lane and terminate nearly aligned with the centre
of the destination lane (e.g., Fig. 4, c, green area). Intentions
are hence modelled with admissible sets gi for γ (e.g., γ 2 gi
with gi like a, b, c, d in Fig. 4).
Since the agent is primarily concerned with selecting the
current control {j(0) = j0, r(0) = r0} (in adaptive be-
haviour future controls can be modified later), a definition
of salience as a means to express how good the choice of
{j0, r0} may be in relation to intention gi, can be given as
follows:
sgi (r0, j0) = sup (V (γ)|r(0) = r0, j(0) = j0, γ 2 gi) .
(1)
This means that the salience value of the instantaneous choice
{j0, r0} for intention gi is that of the optimal γ among all
the trajectories beginning with {j(0) = j0, r(0) = r0} and
belonging to the subset gi, which models the intention.
It is not difficult to recognize the similarity with Reinforce-
ment Learning, where sgi(r0, j0) is the Q function estimating
the future reward for choosing action {j0, r0} at the current
state. However, there are as many reward functions as the
number of goals/intentions gi, possibly organised hierarchi-
cally.
Our “motor cortex” therefore encodes control actions as
being a two-dimensional array of discrete samples of the
control space. It is therefore analogous to the neural structure
in Fig. 2, c, and similar to the output neural array of ALVINN.
The value stored in the motor cortex array is sx(r0, j0),
where x may be either one individual goal or the union
of more (see next section). The discretization is typically
not uniform: finer in the centre of the motor space, where
minute precise control is desirable, and coarser at the edge.
In Dreams4Cars this motor cortex array has size 41⇥41
(element [21, 21] corresponds to the null action), which
means that the agent at the lowest-level chooses among 1681
possible actions, organized in a hierarchy of intentions gi.
FIGURE 3: Topographic organization of the motor space.
The salience of each available action is reported in the “motor
cortex”, which is the two-dimensional space representing the
instantaneous lateral and longitudinal control. Hence, such
map encodes the value of choosing one particular combina-
tion of lateral/longitudinal control at any time.
C. ACTION PRIMING
The instantiation of possible actions corresponds to the com-
putation of the salience sgi(r0, j0), i = 1, . . . , N , where N
is the number of affordances.
1) Modularity and parallelization
The process can be parallelized as shown in Fig. 4. Safety
is the first concern (panel a): the vehicle must stay in the
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road and, if necessary, drive over the lane markings or over
other extra-lane room. The salience is computed for γ 2 a
by means of (1), as shown in the small inset sketch of motor
cortex to the right of the main panel (Fig. 4). Besides remain-
ing on the road, the agent may have three legal intentions:
b, lane following, c, lane change and d, stopping in the
parking spot. For each of them, the salience can be computed
in a similar manner (γ 2 b, c, d), producing motor cortex
activation patterns as shown in the central column of motor
cortical sketches Fig. 4.
FIGURE 4: Modular parallel action priming. In a situation
where there may be several alternative goals (possibly organ-
ised hierarchically), action priming can be parallelised, i.e. by
overlapping the salience of each goal evaluated individually.
Note that, quite generally, intentions correspond to strips
of possibly variable width (the simplest way to know the
strips is if a digital map describing the road at the level
of lanes is available). Hence, a module that computes the
salience for a generic strip is sufficient for generating the
individual activation of each intention. With modularity, the
complexity of action priming is decomposed into developing
simpler functions that prime individual goals, which can be
verified in isolation.
A global salience function can then be obtained via ag-
gregation of the individual ones, as shown in Fig. 4, right,
or Fig. 3, bottom. One possible aggregating function is a
weighted max operator, i.e.:
s(r0, j0) = max(wisgi(r0, j0), gi 2 affordances). (2)
where weights wi may serve to steer action selection as
explained in the following.
2) Scalability
The encoding of action values with salience in the motor
cortex implies scalability: new action possibilities would be
enacted by new branches in Fig. 4 and appear as new active
regions in the motor cortex. Encoded with the same salience
scale, they would be immediately available for competition
with the others and for selection [21].
3) Hierarchy of intentions
Legal intentions are assigned higher salience, symbolised by
darker green tones, for example by using wb ⇡ wc ⇡ wd ⇡ 1
and wa ⌧ 1. In this way the agent will first seek to meet
one action among b, c, d and only if no solution exists it will
use one action in a. This means that only if no legal action
is available the agent will resort on choosing a non-legal
physically feasible action (remaining in the road) as a last
resource.
4) Computation of the “motor cortex”: declarative predictions
The computation of the salience by means of (1) can be
carried out, in principle, with the trajectory planning methods
mentioned in Section I-B1.
For this, (in principle) for every intention gi the motor
space {r0, j0} must be sampled with sufficient density and,
for each {r0, j0}, an optimal trajectory γ, maximizing func-
tional V (γ) that represents the optimality criteria such as
those mentioned in Section I-B1, must be found. We are,
in particular, interested in evaluating the maximum of V (γ),
which is the value of the choice {r0, j0} for intention gi,
i.e., the salience sgi(r0, j0)
2. However, one should note that
this process implies that many optimality problems must be
solved inline simultaneously, one for every discrete choice
of {r0, j0} and for every intention gi yielding a correspond-
ing large number of optimal trajectories that are used for
computing their values; all together computing sgi(r0, j0).
Only one trajectory will be executed though. Evaluating so
many trajectories in every detail for the purpose of extracting
their values (function sgi(r0, j0)) is not very efficient, albeit
there may be several means to accelerate and parallelize the
process.
In the dorsal stream (Fig. 2), conversely, the salience of the
affordable actions is not evaluated via detailed elaboration
of all possible trajectories. Rather associations are learned
that link perceived affordances to estimates of their value.
These allow bypassing low-level detailed and computational
demanding simulations (procedural simulations) to carry out
faster and more abstract predictions (declarative predictions)
[34]. One way to replicate this process, and accelerating the
inline evaluation of sgi(r0, j0), is training a functional ap-
proximation (e.g., a neural network) with examples generated
offline by means of one trajectory planner as above. The
neural network approximant will learn mapping the lane ge-
ometry to the activation pattern (salience). One early example
of this was given in [35]. Another example of training neural
2Of course, for every intention gi one might directly seek the intention-
specific optimal trajectory without discretizing the motor space {r0, j0}.
This would return the optimal control {r0, j0} of each intention. However
in this way the selection of one action (the optimal {r0, j0}) is entangled
with action priming and the only remaining choice would be among the
intentions gi. We seek instead to completely separate action priming from
action selection so that the optimal {r0, j0} may be chosen with finer dis-
cretization and include obstacle inhibitions (see next sub-section). Following
the competition between excitatory and inhibitory affordances, if necessary
{r0, j0} may depart from the local optimum of one single intention being
attracted or repelled by others gi, see example Section III-D.
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network approximants may also be found in [36]. Since the
generation of the training set is carried out offline, there are
no real-time concerns and the number of training examples
can be very large. At inference time the trained network will
short-cut procedural computations quite quickly (if carefully
crafted) and operating in parallel [36].
FIGURE 5: Modular parallel obstacle inhibitions. Inhibi-
tions caused by obstacles have a second level of modularity.
Besides the computation of individual obstacles in parallel,
each obstacle can be resolved into a list of future space time
locations which can be processed in parallel by a module that
inhibits generic space-time regions.
5) Inhibitory circuits (obstacles)
Obstacles are treated as space-time locations to be avoided.
The mapping between these space-time regions and the mo-
tor space is (with some adaptation) derived from the same
functions used for mapping lane regions into humps of activ-
ities. The main difference is that the undesirable space-time
locations are inhibited, essentially zeroing the salience for
high collision probabilities (total inhibitions), and partially
decreasing the salience where the probability of collision is
secondary.
The computation of the inhibitions may be broken down
into a further level of modularity: a) prediction of the ob-
stacle trajectory (Fig. 5, top) and b) inhibition of space-time
regions (bottom). Hence, in case of malfunctions one can
diagnose whether the prediction of the obstacle trajectory
was incorrect or whether the inhibitions were incorrectly
computed [36]. The idea of separating desirable (mostly
static) and undesirable (mostly dynamic) space-time regions
via excitatory and inhibitory circuits is one way to solve
the problem of trajectory planning with moving obstacles,
which is otherwise very difficult to compute simultaneously
and an often recognized hindrance for traditional trajectory
planning.
In the example of Fig. 5 the choice between actions a
and b depends on how much a is inhibited by the obstacle.
The Agent will choose to change lane in response to a cut-in
manoeuvre that requires significant speed reduction.
D. ACTION SELECTION
The action values stored in the motor cortex are readily
available for action selection. The most obvious selection
criterion is the “winner takes all” (WTA), i.e., choosing the
action with the maximum instantaneous value.
1) Robust action selection: the MSPRT algorithm
In presence of noise the WTA criterion may not be the best
option. An instantaneous snapshot of salience maps in the
“motor cortex” may not reflect the distribution of mean val-
ues, derived by accumulating “evidence” over small periods
of time, and which may offer the basis for a better decision.
This problem of decision making using noisy evidence is
a general problem in many domains and, one approach to
its solution is supplied by the Multi-hypothesis Sequential
Probability Ratio Test (MSPRT) [37], [38]. This choice of
algorithm is supported the observation that the biological
decision making mechanism – the basal ganglia – appears
to have strong connections with the MSPRT [4].
The MSPRT, can be shown, under certain circumstances,
to carry out time-optimal decision making with noise in the
sense that it gives the shortest time to decision, given an
acceptable error rate in making such decisions (to guarantee
correct decision on every occasion would require evidence
be accumulated indefinitely). We use an adaptation of the
MSPRT (Algorithm 1), suitable for use with our action
salience maps, and for online working with non-stationary
inputs in a similar way to that described in [39].
The adapted MSPRT algorithm works by accumulating ev-
idence for each action over time (CurrentChannels ap-
pended to StoredChannels in Algorithm 1), and finding
the negative log likelihood that each channel is drawn from
a distribution with a higher mean than the other channels
(vector NegLogLikelihoodChannels in Algorithm 1).
VOLUME 4, 2016 7
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI
10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3007018, IEEE Access
M. Da Lio et al.: Agent Architecture for Adaptive Behaviours in Autonomous Driving
Algorithm 1: MSPRT algorithm.
Data: CurrentChannels, Threshold, Deadline, ForgetTime
Result: Selected Action (ArgMinLikelihood and MinLikelihood)
Start with empty StoredChannels;
while Decision not yet made do
StoredChannels Append(CurrentChannels) // store salience vectors;
AccumulatedChannels Total(StoredChannels) //Total across list (temporal total);
NegLogLikelihoodChannels − AccumulatedChannels + Log(Total(Exp(StoredChannels)));
MinLikelihood Min(NegLogLikelihoodChannels);
ArgMinLikelihood ArgMin(NegLogLikelihoodChannels);
if MinLikelihood < Threshold then
forget frames before ForgetTime in the StoredChannels;
Return ArgMinLikelihood and MinLikelihood // selection before deadline;
end
if Deadline is elapsed then
reset the StoredChannels;
Return ArgMinLikelihood and MinLikelihood // selection after deadline;
end
end
The algorithm may be implemented at the level of the
aggregated motor cortex (Eq. (2)), in which case the compet-
ing channels (CurrentChannels) are the distinct values
s(r0, j0) of the salience array resulting from the discretiza-
tion of the space r0, j0 (see also, [40]).
The algorithm can also be used at higher intentional levels:
for example the weighted individual activation patterns of
each intention (wisgi(r0, j0)) may be first summarised into
scalar channels Si by means of an appropriate aggregation
operator. In this case the competition occurs among the
intentions (the CurrentChannels are the Si).
The competition between channels is enacted by the scalar
term Log(Total(Exp(StoredChannels))), added to all
NegLogLikelihoodChannels channels at each itera-
tion. The Total operator works across the temporal dimen-
sion, i.e., by summing the CurrentChannels recorded
in StoredChannels list. Once the log likelihood crosses
the given Threshold, the action becomes selected. The
Threshold has to be tuned such that some predetermined
error rate is permitted. If the threshold is not passed before
a given Deadline, the algorithm can be stopped by taking
the most likely optimal choice accrued so far.
2) Trajectory instantiation
Once an action {r0, j0} is selected, one can propagate the
selection backwards in the dorsal stream finding (symbolised
by the dashed red arrow in Fig. 3), for example, which object,
and at which future time, is limiting the movement (for
example Fig. 5); or which is the intended lane (Fig. 4). Then,
(only) the trajectory to be actually used is computed with the
necessary details and forwarded to the motor system (Fig. 4,
blue arrow). This idea is also consistent with the architecture
proposed by Meyer and Damasio [27], in particular where
backwards signalling is foreseen.
3) Minimum commitment principle
The selection of one instantaneous action {r0, j0}, when
propagated backwards in the dorsal stream, often identifies
multiple goals that are compatible with {r0, j0} (albeit one
is the strongest). For example, in Fig. 3 the intention of lane
keeping (a), and the possible intention of changing lane later
(c’) map onto the same instantaneous control. Hence, with
selection of the peak a in Fig. 3, bottom, the agent is also
“keeping the door open” for c’. Choosing between a and
c’ does not require an immediate selection (at the level of
{r0, j0}) and, with the choice of the instantaneous action the
agent carries out only the minimum commitment possible:
i.e., it chooses all the trajectories that share the same control
with a, and excludes only c and b.
E. INTEGRATING TRAFFIC REGULATIONS VIA BIASING
ACTION SELECTION
So far, the behaviours emerge from a proper architecture and
the physical awareness of the environment. However, driving
is also a matter of regulation (for example, one should not
cross solid lane markings). The question of how to teach the
traffic rules to an artificial driver may be solved, once again,
with biological inspiration [25]. In particular, we exploit the
idea that behavioural choice can be steered by biasing low
level, motoric action selection with higher level goals (Fig. 2,
“higher-level action biasing” loop). In this way, modules that
implement rules can act on the agent by specifying desirable
and undesirable space-time locations. The high level rules
are used to bias individual intentions (e.g., multiplying the
individual activations (after inhibitions) sgi(r0, j0) by gains
wi before combining the aggregated motor cortex as in (2).
An example is given in Fig. 6, where the intention of
remaining in lane may be artificially strengthened (green,
peak a) whereas the possibility of turning right may be
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artificially weakened (yellow, peak b). This way, all three
possible actions are passed to the selection process, but a is
recommended and b discouraged. If, for example, an obsta-
cle were severely inhibiting the recommended lane keeping
intention a, the Agent would resort to c and then b with this
priority order. The biasing weights may be hand tuned with
simulation (the process is not very critical) or, as we have
recently shown, the weights may be learned within a low-
dimensional Reinforcement Learning problem (e.g., [41]).
FIGURE 6: Action biasing principle. Action selection can be
steered towards long-term goals by weighting the salience of
individual intentions; for example increasing the salience of a
and decreasing the salience of b (centre). Notably, the process
of action biasing is safe because inhibited actions remain un-
selectable (bottom).
1) Bias versus lower-level veto
Biasing, as described above, can be used to program traffic
rules by strongly recommending or discouraging particular
actions. However, notice that biasing does not completely
preclude an action, which may still be executed if its pre-
bias salience is high enough; a situation which might occur
in safety critical situations such as collision avoidance. This
idea is developed further in Section III-C.
However, action biasing can only work in the space of
safe and possible actions. That is, if part of the action space
is inhibited then, whatever the biasing weights, no action
may be performed in that sub-space. No completely inhibited
action can ever be selected; the main sensorimotor loop will
not implement recommendations that correspond to unsafe
actions, a feature we call the “principle of lower-level veto”.
This relieves the need for testing safety of the higher-level
biasing loops.
F. ADDITIONAL IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
This paper has focused on sensorimotor principles in order
to describe the whole picture. Many details that could not be
fitted into the main narrative here can be found in the public
deliverables of the Dreams4Cars Research Action [1].
III. OPEN ACCESS DEMONSTRATIONS
This section presents four different examples that, together,
demonstrate the flexibility of the Agent architecture, which
has been explained above from a principled/theoretical point
of view.
A) The first example demonstrates complex adaptive and
explainable behaviours emerging from the affordance
competition principle; highlighting, in particular, the
importance of the topographic organization of the motor
cortex (Sections II-B to II-D).
B) The second example demonstrates robust action selec-
tion by comparing the commonly used Winner Takes All
(WTA) selection criterion versus the Multi-hypothesis
Sequential Probability Ratio Test algorithm (MSPRT)
(Section II-D); in particular showing that the latter
yields stable decisions at the cost of a minimal self-
adapted increase in the decision time.
C) The third example demonstrates higher-level action bi-
asing (Section II-E); in particular showing increased
driving efficiency obtained via proactive steering of low-
level action-selection.
D) The final example demonstrates hierarchical action-
selection producing adaptation of the Agent to rapid
unexpected events by, if necessary, forcing the traffic
rules and choosing the lesser evil; highlighting, also,
the importance of dense topographic organization of the
motor space (Section II-B).
The examples (with the exception of the second, that
includes real data experiments and a different simulation
platform) may be found in the Open Data repository [3],
where they can be reproduced or played. The environment
VOLUME 4, 2016 9
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI
10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3007018, IEEE Access
M. Da Lio et al.: Agent Architecture for Adaptive Behaviours in Autonomous Driving
used for these is the OpenDS open source driving simulator3
[42].
A. EMERGENT ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOURS
The example is given in Fig. 7, which presents the case of the
Agent car (the black car) driving in a very wide lane, with two
(red) vehicles —one is not visible yet in the camera view—
closely following on both sides (time: 6.0 s). A standing (red)
car is also present in the centre of the lane far ahead, which
is also not visible yet.
The frames show a camera view (left) and the density plot
of the motor cortex values (right). The dark blue circle is
the selected action. The distinction between green and white
is made to mark the longitudinal controls that comply with
the speed limit. So, any choice in the green area does not
violate the speed limit but, of course, the fastest option is
on the boundary between green and white. For clarity the
decrease of salience laterally, due to the lane limited width, is
not shown. In the camera view, the pink line visualizes the in-
stantaneous selected trajectory, which is generated following
Section II-D2.
At time 6.0 s the inhibitions caused by the nearby cars (the
right one is not visible yet in the camera view) appear in
the motor cortex (red is total inhibition and yellow is partial
inhibition). The Agent is travelling straight and hence its
choice (blue circle) is not affected. Nonetheless one could say
that the Agent is “aware” of the presence of the two vehicles
because its motor space “reports” that some actions are no
longer possible.
At time 11.5 s the far vehicle ahead is detected causing
an inhibited region that overlaps with the previous current
choice. At time 12.0 s the agent finds that it is possible to
keep running at maximum speed by steering to the right.
That means that the Agent “thinks” to pass on the right of
the far obstacle and ahead of the vehicle that is following on
the right.
This illustrates how the agent decisions can be explained.
We, for example, know that if such an option was to be
discarded from the beginning, a greater safety gap (yellow
inhibition) should have been taught to the agent.
At time 13.3 s the option for passing on the right and
ahead of the following vehicle is no longer safe enough (dark
yellow), thus the agent opts for remaining in the centre of the
lane and reducing the speed according to the distant obstacle.
However, as the Agent reduces its speed a gap opens on the
left side.
At time 16.9 s the agent makes the decision of passing on
the left behind the left vehicle. Between time 16.9 s and 19.5 s
we can see how this intention is maintained (no need for
further revising it) and the manoeuvre that follows is exactly
what could be expected. Eventually, after the overtake has
been performed, at time 22.2 s the agent decides to return to
the lane center.
3https://opends.dfki.de/
Overall, the example shows the emergence of complex
adaptive behaviours from basic principles, and from the way
the sensorimotor architecture is organized (there were no
rules programmed, as such). The agent decisions can always
be clearly explained, and it is also clear what could be tuned
for modifying the behaviours.
1) Relation to agents with programmed behaviours
The same situation was run using an agent with rule-based
behaviours that could be transparently accessed. Here, the
agent remained stuck behind the stopped vehicle, as if it were
unable to make use of the unusual width of the lane; or as if
the stopped vehicle were schematically blocking “the (entire)
lane”. Another shortcoming was found earlier in a scenario
consisting of a pedestrian incorrectly crossing the road when
the traffic light turns red for the pedestrian and green for the
car, as shown in [43].
Nonetheless, when comparing agents with emergent be-
haviours – like this one – to agents with programmed be-
haviours – for example implemented with finite state ma-
chines – our examples cannot be generalised to say that
the latter necessarily underperforms. First, the mechanism
of the choice among different alternatives (albeit perhaps
more schematic) also exists in more traditional designs as
mentioned in Section I-B1, and so they also exhibit some
degree of adaptive behaviour. Second, with programmed
behaviours the outcome depends on which behaviours have
been implemented. If some shortcoming is detected the pro-
gram can be updated – for example new rules or states and
transitions can be added.
Hence, we argue that, while in principle a given ability can
be obtained with both approaches, the difference is in the ef-
fort needed for development. We argue that the development
of agents that are programmed in detail is going to be more
laborious, and requires us to identify every possible situation
and identify how to operate therein. Conversely, and agent
with emergent behaviors tends to be more robust, producing
correct behaviours more often. Debugging is necessary also
for the latter, but occurs more at the level of testing the imple-
mentation of principles like correctly computing inhibitions,
correct biasing etc..
B. ROBUST ACTION SELECTION: WTA VS MSPRT
This scenario, shown in Fig. 8, is studied with IPG Car-
Maker; an industry-standard simulation tool that was used in
Dreams4Cars to create a virtual validated model of one real
test vehicle (a Jeep Renegade). Since the overtake scenario
was really tested on the Jeep Renegade (WTA only) and
reproduced in simulation with CarMaker (both WTA and
MSPRT), hence the example is presented with CarMaker
instead of OpenDS data.
The scenario realizes one situation where two actions
become equally salient, which is ideal to evaluate the effect
of noise in action selection. Thus, re-entering from the left
lane after an overtake manoeuvre may, at some point and
conditions, form two almost equivalent choices (Fig. 8, point
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FIGURE 7: Example of emergent behaviours. The motor cortex activation is shown next to the camera view for different
moments of the simulation. The inhibited (red/yellow for total/partial inhibition) and affordable actions (green) and the agent
choices (blue circle) are easily explainable (see text for more comments), generating an, overall, complex behaviour that
corresponds to what might be commonly expected.
2). The conditions are here explained: one way for returning
to the right lane may be to bias the right lane choice (Fig. 8,
b) according to Section II-E. The bias can be set in advance,
such as, e.g, before point 2 in Fig. 8, or may even be let set
forever. In both cases the lane change will occur only as soon
as a collision free manoeuvre is available (i.e., at point 2) and
not earlier (lower-level veto). Advance biasing is thus a way
to induce right lane changes to occur as early as possible.
Fig. 9 compares the steering rate4 r0 for WTA and MSPRT.
At point 1, travelled distance 86m, a stopped obstacle is de-
tected for the first time 100m ahead. Of the two options, stop-
ping behind the obstacle (dashed arrow, Fig. 8) immediately
has considerably less value than overtaking (solid line arrow).
In this case the lane change is by far the winner action and
no competition occurs in practice with the stop option. The
4The “steering rate” is defined here as the rate of change of curvature of
the vehicle trajectory.
FIGURE 8: Returning to the right lane after an overtake.
At point 2, actions a and b have the same salience. With
noise, the WTA criterion may cause oscillations, which are
not produced with MSPRT.
requested steering rate (that represents the selected action
r0) jumps immediately to approximately 0.02m
−1s−1 which
corresponds to the lane change manoeuvre. The executed
steering rate follows with a slight delay due to the steering
actuator lags and to the vehicle dynamics lags (it is the
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FIGURE 9: Returning to the right lane after overtake. WTA
criterion causes oscillations, which are not seen with MSPRT
(the oscillations of the steering rate control happening before
the obstacle location for WTA).
requested steering rate that represents the selected action).
A different situation happens at point 2. When this point
is approached the right lane affordance becomes gradually
stronger until, at point 2, travelled distance 154m, the
salience of the action b slightly tops the salience of a. The
WTA selection (Fig. 9, “Requested” line on top) occurs as
soon as b tops a and the execution follows with the usual
delay. However, because of noise in the perception and the
motor control, once the manoeuvre is initiated, there are
oscillations in the obstacle inhibitions strength and fluctua-
tions of the salience of b compared to a, which revert the
decision as shown with the fluctuations in the requested
and executed steering rate. These oscillations last until the
obstacle is finally passed. The MSPRT selection is shown in
(Fig. 9, bottom). In this case, since there is a competition
between two almost equally strong affordances a and b, the
MSPRT algorithm delays its decision until there is enough
evidence that b is the winner action. The delay (the drop
of the “Requested” line) is not severe: about 100ms–150ms
as marked by the slight distance between grid line at 154m
and the drop of the orange line in the chart. On the other
hand the decision is stable (the steering rate returns slight
positive when the trajectory must be straightened to enter the
destination lane). Note also that at point 1, when there was
no doubt about the choice, MSPRT was almost as fast as the
WTA. In this example MSPRT adapted the decision time.
C. (PROACTIVE) ACTION BIASING
For this demonstration, we considered a three lanes motor-
way scenario with stochastic traffic. The comparison takes
place by running the same situations with two versions of
the agent: with and without biasing the selection of lanes.
The objective is to show that, with proper biases, the agent
develops more effective longer-term behaviours and, also,
complies with the rule of using the right-most free lane, when
available.
A total number of 100 simulations were performed, 50
with and 50 without the lane selection biasing. Every sim-
ulation corresponds to driving along a 5 km straight section
of the motorway. The traffic is initialised by placing a ran-
dom number of vehicles from a discrete uniform distribution
between 30 and 70 vehicles. Each vehicle is placed on a
random lane (left, centre, right) at a random distance drawn
from a uniform distribution between 50m–1750m ahead of
the agent’s vehicle (avoiding traffic vehicles overlaps). The
vehicles on the left lane are assigned a random velocity
between 100 km/h–110 km/h (uniform distribution); on the
centre lane between 80 km/h–90 km/h; on the right lane
between 50 km/h–70 km/h. The ego vehicle target speed
is set to 140 km/h such that it will overtake to run faster
whenever the possibility occurs.
1) No biasing
In this version of the Agent, the salience of the affordable
lanes is not biased (the weights wi in Eq. (2) are the same
for all the three lanes). The agent will remain in its lane until
a leading vehicle begins inhibiting the free-flow longitudinal
control (such as, e.g, Fig. 6, bottom). When the slow-down
caused by this inhibition becomes large enough, a nearby
lane, either left or right, will be selected if less inhibited
(for this to happen the slow-down cost must exceed the
lane change cost). Hence the Agent has to first enter a car-
following penalising situation before feeling the need for a
lane change.
2) Biasing lane selection
In this version, lane selection is biased according to the
following logic:
• if the right lane is not slower than the Agent target speed,
then the right lane is biased;
• else, if the current lane is slower than the target speed
and the left lane is faster, then the left lane is given
priority.
The speed of one lane is determined by the slowest vehicle
travelling in the lane segment from the current position to
a given distant horizon. This may include far vehicles that
are not yet causing car-following. The logic is proactive,
anticipating lane change before car-following conditions are
reached. The speed is topped by the speed limit of the lane.
If the lane is free, the lane’s speed is the speed limit.
With the first criterion, the ego vehicle gradually moves to
the rightmost lane if that does not reduce its travel time. With
the second criterion, the ego vehicle moves to a left faster
lane if that improves its travel time.
One important remark is that the evaluation of the criteria
can be carried out on a simple schematic instantaneous
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situation without needing precise evaluation of objects tra-
jectories. The criteria, in fact, produce only priorities for the
action selection. For example, if the criteria set the priority
for a lane change, but there is a vehicle cutting in, the choice
will be rejected because the obstacle will be inhibiting the
lane salience.
Another remark is that these criteria, as formulated above,
permit passing on the right. This may/may not be allowed de-
pending on the particular road and highway code (preventing
passing on the right would require additional criteria).
3) Results
Table 1 shows: a) the percentage of the time spent in the
car-following condition, b) the mean time spent in one lane
between lane changes and c) the average travelling velocity.
Biasing yields a reduction of 32% (from 74.5% to 50.5%)
of the car-following time, which is obtained with more
frequent lane changes (from 31.9 s down to 17.9 s between
lane changes) and an higher average speed (from 96.7 km/h
to 109.5 km/h). In evaluating the latter, one must consider
that the leftmost lane is populated with vehicles travelling
at speeds between 100 km/h–110 km/h: the mean travelling
speed is thus the average between car-following conditions
and the occasionally faster free-flow conditions.
TABLE 1: Highway simulation scenario results.
case
mean time
in car-follow (%)
mean time
in one lane
mean
velocity
“bias” 50.5 17.9 s 109.5 km/h
“no bias” 74.5 31.9 s 96.7 km/h
The vehicle velocity, per lane, is shown in Fig. 10 and
Fig. 11, respectively for the “bias” and no “bias cases”. So,
in Fig. 10 the bottom sub-chart (red, right lane) shows the
vehicle speed in the 50 simulations when the vehicle was
in the right lane. One can notice a large number of cases
where the speed drops from 140 km/h to 50 km/h–70 km/h.
These are transitions from free flow to car-following, when
a leading vehicle is approached. The car-following condition
does not last much: as soon as it is possible, the car changes to
the central lane (the speed profile continues in the middle lane
chart, green). Often, the lane change happens already during
the slow down phase, before entering the constant speed car-
following condition. In only one case (at about 4500m), the
vehicle remained trapped in car-follow for some time. The
middle lane chart shows the acceleration phases of the vehi-
cle coming from the right lane (short traits below 50 km/h–
70 km/h as well as further acceleration to 140 km/h when
the lane is free. Notice that the vehicle never remains in car-
following in the middle lane, because it has twice lane change
opportunities (either to the left or to the right). The left lane
chart shows accelerations from the vehicle coming from the
middle lane, as well as transitions from full speed down
to the 100 km/h–110 km/h traffic speed. In this lane the
vehicle remains often trapped behind the fast traffic. The “no
FIGURE 10: Lane selection with proactive bias (“bias” case).
Velocity profiles of the 50 simulations. The speed of the
vehicle is represented in the sub-chart of the lane where
the vehicle is located. From top to bottom: the left, centre
and right lanes are represented with blue, green and red
respectively. The profiles on one lane are interrupted where
the vehicle changes lane .
FIGURE 11: Lane selection without proactive bias (“no bias”
case). Compared to the previous figure, the velocity profiles
reveal that, without proactive lane change, the agent may
remain frequently trapped behind slower vehicles in both the
middle and the rightmost lane.
bias” case (Fig. 11) shows a less efficient behaviour that is
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produced without the proactive promotion of lane changes. In
particular, one can notice that the ego vehicle remains easily
trapped in the traffic, both in the right and, also, middle lane.
Furthermore, the lane changes from the right to the middle
lane are less frequent in the slow-down phase. The mean
travelling speed is annotated per lane. While there is no great
improvement in the leftmost lane, a significant improvement
is observed in the middle and especially the rightmost lane,
which is conveniently used whenever it is free. The general
conclusion is that proactively biasing action selection, by
anticipating virtuous manoeuvres, increases efficiency.
D. HIERARCHICAL ACTION-SELECTION
This final example investigates the adaptation of the Agent to
rapid unexpected events, if necessary responding by forcing
the traffic rules and choosing the lesser evil. The study is
inspired by the situation shown in Fig. 1. The ego car travels
on a straight three-lane motorway following a vehicle that,
unexpectedly drops an object (a traffic cone in the simulation,
see schematic representation in Fig. 12). In the longitudinal
direction the motion of the fallen object is uniformly deceler-
ated. In the lateral direction it weaves from left to right with
a linearly increasing amplitude, as defined by equation (3),
which will be later commented.
The traffic is travelling at 60.0 km/h, which is also the
initial speed at which the cone is released. In order to have
a schematic situation that helps interpretation, the spacing of
the vehicles is uniform, but the relative position ∆s of the
next vehicle in both lanes may vary (Fig. 12).
Parametric simulations have been carried out by varying:
1) the traffic density, which may be either “high” (vehicle
separation 1.8 s, or 30m) or “low” (separation 3 s, or
50m),
2) deceleration of the fallen object, acone 2 {−5.0,−4.5,
−4.0,−3.5,−3.0,−2.5,−2.0} m/s2;
3) time headway between ego and leading vehicle
Th 2 {1.25, 1.5, 1.75, 2.0, 2.25, 2.5} s.
For each case, i.e. the combination of one traffic density
(high/low), one value of acone and one value of Th we
performed 20 simulations, for a total of 20⇥2⇥7⇥6 = 1680
simulations.
Each simulation was carried out with partially random
lateral cone movements, generated by (3) with phase φ0
drawn from a uniform distribution U (−pi/4, pi/4). Hence, the
lateral displacement of the cone yc(x) is given as a function
of the longitudinal distance x travelled by the cone
yc(x) = 0.05x sin (λx+ φ0) + U (−0.05, 0.05) , (3)
where λ = 20m−1 is the period of the oscillations whereas
the amplitude increases linearly with the travelled distance x.
Also, while the traffic was regularly spaced, the relative
position ∆s of the next vehicle ahead (there are also vehicles
behind) on both the left and right lanes was set randomly
from a random uniform distribution U(0, L), with L being
the spacing between the vehicles in the traffic (L = 30m for
high density traffic and L = 50m for low density traffic).
FIGURE 12: Schematic representation of the “US 101” sce-
nario (Section III-D). The road cone falls from a leading
car and follows a partially random trajectory. The ego car,
yellow vehicle, attempts to either brakes or force change lane
(including fitting in between lanes).
To model mechanical and actuation delays, the ego ve-
hicle deceleration rate (longitudinal jerk) cannot exceed
−10m/s3. This means that it takes 0.5 s to reach −5m/s2,
which is the largest cone deceleration considered (in a real
vehicle this figure may vary depending on the braking plant
characteristics). Also, because the Agent re-planning loop
runs at 20Hz there is an additional 50ms delay between
perception and action request (this figure may also vary).
Finally, we assume that the range sensor and perception sys-
tem detecting the cone measure the distance and the velocity
of the cone, but does not estimate the acceleration. Because
of these limitations, and depending on the time headway at
the moment of the object fall the collision might indeed be
unavoidable.
Finally, it has to be said that, for this study, the mechanism
for proactively changing lane, as described in Section III-C,
is not active (otherwise the car would change to lanes as
soon as they have farther obstacles and will not permanently
remain in car-following, which is necessary for this study)
1) Results
With high-density traffic, there are no gaps in the adjacent
lanes where the vehicle can fit while fully preserving the
desired longitudinal safety distances. Yet, these gaps (1.8 s)
are wide enough to fit inside without collision5, especially
if the car does not move entirely into the destination lane but
stays on the lane border over the lane markings. Interestingly,
the choice of such a “least evil” behaviour is generated by the
play between partial and total inhibitions: with a dense “mo-
tor cortex” many intermediate actions exists among which
some collision free choice, albeit not prefect, can be found.
This is shown in Fig. 13 which presents two instants of
the same simulation. On top, the ego vehicle (the black car)
follows the “dangerous” car before the object falls. When,
sometimes later, the cone falls (time: 15.0 s), the Agent
5Moving into a 1.8 s gap, the host vehicle is going to leave only a fraction
of a second gap between the vehicle in front or behind.
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initially adapts to the reducing speed of the obstacle until,
at some point (time: 16.5 s) the action corresponding to
squeezing between the current lane and the right lane change
is chosen despite being partially inhibited by a nearer car
behind (darker yellow area in Fig. 13 bottom). As shown in
this example, the agent does not move completely into the
right lane but shifts laterally only as much as needed to avoid
the obstacle.
FIGURE 13: Example of emergency avoidance behaviour.
The Agent chooses a risky action (bottom figure) to avoid
the collision with the dropping obstacle.
Fig. 14 shows the trajectories of the ego vehicle for differ-
ent combinations of cone deceleration and time headway. We
distinguish the results in terms of three possible outcomes:
overtake, in case the ego vehicle clears the cone by passing
laterally and continues travelling along the road (blue lines);
stop, if the ego vehicle stops without hitting the obstacle
(green lines); collision if a collision occurs either in the
attempt of passing or stopping (red lines). Similarly, Fig. 15
shows the trajectories for the high density traffic case.
Concerning trajectories that clear the obstacle (blue lines),
one can notice that manoeuvres corresponding to travelling in
between the lanes, such as the one shown in Fig. 13, are not
very frequent. This is because the traffic reacts and it often
happens that when the ego vehicle moves in front of one
vehicle, this vehicle opens a greater gap which lets complete
the lane change (this is revealed by changes in the trajectory
shapes that follows adaptations of the traffic, especially at
short time headways).
By counting the number of clear, stop and collision ma-
noeuvres the probability of the three outcomes can be esti-
mated (somewhat coarsely because there are only 20 sim-
ulations per case). These are shown in Fig. 16 and Fig. 17
respectively for the low and high density traffic cases.
If the low density traffic is considered (Fig. 16 and Fig. 14)
one can notice the presence of 4 different clusters. For
deceleration below 4m/s2 and time headway above 2 s the
Agent stops. Instead if the time headway is below 2 s the
FIGURE 14: Low density traffic. Trajectories as function
of time headway and cone deceleration with distinction for
collision (red), stop (green) and clear (blue).
FIGURE 15: High density traffic. Trajectories as function
of time headway and cone deceleration with distinction for
collision (red), stop (green) and clear (blue).
FIGURE 16: Low density traffic. Probability for collision,
stop and clear manoeuvres. With high deceleration of the
cone, the most probable outcome is collision. Otherwise, if
the time headway is short, the agent tries to force a lane
change (detailed discussion in the text).
Agent prefers to overtake. However, if the time headway is
very small, 1.25 s the Agent stops or overtake with similar
probabilities. Which happens depends on the what is on the
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FIGURE 17: High density traffic. Probability for collision,
stop and clear manoeuvres. With higher density of the traffic,
forcing a lane change is less likely (detailed discussion in the
text).
side: gaps or obstacles. For deceleration above 4.5m/s2 a
collision almost always occurs (with slight greater proba-
bility for shorter time hideaways). The collisions are due
to the (assumed) limitation in the perception system that
does not estimate the obstacle deceleration. Without knowing
the deceleration, the average future velocity is systematical
overestimated and this error is larger for larger deceleration
until a collision may happen. The high density traffic is
similar (Fig. 17 and Fig. 15) but in this case, below 4m/s2
(where the car can stop) we see an expansion of the stop
choice, because, of course, there is no completely free gap
on both sides. When the time headway is very small (1.25 s)
the Agent forces the lane change such as in Fig. 13. If the
deceleration is above 4m/s2 collisions occur, with higher
probability and a similar pattern (worse for shorter time
headway).
E. OTHER EXAMPLES
A project video with other examples is given in [44]. and
we draw attention to several specific segments. Thus, at
video times 0:37-1:29 there are four examples of emergent
longitudinal behaviours (car following, stopped obstacle,
suddenly braking leading car and pedestrian walking in the
middle of the road), which are generated, similarly to those
in Section III-A by the mechanism of Section II-C5.
At video times 1:29-1:53 there are two other examples of
obstacles suddenly entering the road (a walking and a running
pedestrian).
Proactive behaviour is shown at times 1:53-2:10. The
example consists of the preventive adoption of a safe reduced
speed in the proximity of a pedestrian that might enter the
road (before the pedestrian starts moving). This high-level
behaviour is further discussed in Section IV.
Action selection is presented between times 2:10 and 3:14.
First, the effect of sensor and motor noise with the WTA
selection criterion is shown. Then, better evidence-based
MSPRT robust action selection is shown beginning at time
2:40.
Complex behaviours in a motorway scenario, generated
by affordance competition with proactive biasing of action
selection (similarly to Section III-C) is shown between times
3:53 and 4:51.
Finally, complex behaviours in a urban-like scenarios,
which includes intersections, are shown beginning at time
4.52
IV. EXTENSIONS: LEARNING VIA MENTAL IMAGERY
While this paper dealt with emergent autonomy, the agent
described here was conceived with the final goal of learning
and optimizing behaviours via a process that might be called
“mental simulation”, which is inspired by the ability of
humans to use mental imagery to explore future possibilities,
including those in the dream state while sleeping [45]–[47].
This form of learning for artificial agents was the main
goal of the Dreams4Cars project [1] (point b in the introduc-
tion), and was successfully achieved by building on the agent
architecture described here. These results will be shown,
in full, in future publications, but preliminary reports are
available in the public project deliverables (such as D3.3,
D7.3., that can be found in the project website), in [48]–[50]
and in two communication project videos [44], [51].
In learning via mental simulation, the Agent does not
interact with the plant/environment directly (which would be
a form of Reinforcement Learning); instead, it first learns a
model of the plant/environment and then interacts within that
model. In this way, the agent can test actions that would be
dangerous in the real world. Also the agent is focused on
constructing its own predictive and control models, which
can be tested and improved the next time that agent acts in the
real world. Finally, a less evident, but actually very important
point, is that, once a model of the environment/plant is
available, there are ways to synthesize inverse models for
control and behaviour that are more efficient than trial and
error direct interaction with the learned models as shown
next.
Learning with mental simulations requires additional loops
that are not shown in Fig. 2. There are, in particular, two main
loci/methods for learning.
One approach bootstraps the Agent sensorimotor system
bottom up, starting with the learning of low-level forward
models and, via progressive manipulation of these models,
synthesizing low and higher-level forward and inverse mod-
els that may become particular instantiations of the motor
output loop (motor control) and of the dorsal stream (new
excitatory and inhibitory circuits representing the ability to
detect/prime new/better affordances). Two examples of neu-
ral network controllers for predictive lateral control learned
with this process are visible in the video [44] at, respectively,
time 3:15 and time 3:29.
A second locus of learning is at the action selection and
consists of learning the biases that produce longer terms
rewards, while transversing in the short term states of little
value (for example transversing a slow lane to get to a faster
one could be an extension of the mechanism used in Sec-
tion II-E). This can be regarded as a form of Reinforcement
Learning (among the affordable actions). A slightly different
variant of this method concerns the learning of behavioural
parameters (for example the choice of a safe speed related to
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a given context). This is also learnable quite efficiently with
Reinforcement Learning. Two examples of this are given in
the video [44] at, respectively, time 1:53 and time 5:04.
The project video [51] (simplified for communication
purposes) gives an overall description of both the goals
mentioned in the introduction, and clarifies how the agent
architecture described in this paper functions with learning
via mental imagery.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper described a sensorimotor architecture based on
a few, biologically inspired principles, which is capable
of producing adaptive autonomy while incorporating logi-
cal criteria. The position is supported by open accessible
working examples. The same scenarios could also be used
as benchmarks. Additional examples (not described in this
paper) that extend the demonstration abilities may be found
in the ZENODO repository [52]. This paper focused on the
high level architectural principles and there are several ways
to implement them; additional details for the Dreams4Cars
implementation can be found in the public deliverables [1].
Explainability of the agent decision is, also, of prime impor-
tance. The topographic organization of the motor space is a
key contributor to this feature because the competing actions
can be identified, and the selected action can be back traced
in the dorsal stream finding the intentions that generated the
selection.
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